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The Ermine and Woolsack: Disciplinary 
Proceedings Involving Judges, 
Attorney-Magistrates, and Other Judicial Figures 
DAVID CLEVELAND* AND JASON MASIMORE** 
The idea that the judicial office is supposed to be invested with ermine, though 
fabulous and mythical, is yet most eloquent in significance. We are told that the 
little creature called the ermine, is so acutely sensitive as to its own cleanliness, 
that it becomes paralyzed and powerless at the slightest touch of defilement 
upon its snow-white fur .... And a like sensibility should belong to him who 
comes to exercise the august functions of a judge. It is his exalted province to 
pronounce upon the rights of life, liberty, and property, to make the law 
respected and amiable in the sight of the people; to dignify that department of 
the government upon which, more than all others depend the peace, the 
happiness, and the security of the people. But when once this great office 
becomes corrupted, when its judgments come to reflect the passions or the 
interest of the magistrate rather than the mandates of the law, the courts have 
ceased to be the conservators of the common weal, and the law itself is 
debauched into a prostrate and nerveless mockery. 
Harrison v. Wisdom, 
54 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99 (1872) 
In the Middle Ages, the wool trade was the main source of commercial wealth 
in England, and tradition has it that the woolsack was introduced in the House 
of Lords to symbolize the importance of wool in the commerce of the realm. 
Royal officials attending Parliament were entitled to sit on a woolsack and the 
Lord Chancellor, who enjoyed precedence over all peers except a prince royal, 
sat on the woolsack nearest the throne. In time, it became customary for the 
Lord Chancellor to sit on the woolsack when he delivered judgment in the 
Court of Chancery. 
C. Ray Miles Const. Co., Inc. v. Weaver, 
373 S.E.2d 905, 906 (S.C. App. 1988) 
INTRODUCTION 
The modem legal system is comprised of a discrete class of professional 
lawyers and judges. Lawyers and judges are drawn from the same lot of 
individuals, and the ethical obligations of both groups overlap. However, because 
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, May 2002 (expected). 
** J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, May 2002 (expected). 
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our sense of professional ethics is also role-based, lawyers and judges often face 
different ethical obligations. While lawyers are viewed as functional elements in 
the orderly administration of justice, judges are often equated with justice itself, 
and they are therefore often held to a higher standard. 1 "A judge increases his 
stature by ... the extent to which he squares his conduct with approved moral 
and professional standards. The public has a right to expect that of him and if he 
does not choose to impose such a standard on himself ·he should not accept 
judicial appointment. "2 
This Note begins in Part I by introducing and explaining how a large measure 
of our system of legal ethics is determined based on the role of actors within the 
system. Parts II and ill present general overviews of the discipline system of 
lawyers and judges, respectively. Part IV presents an in-depth examination of 
some of the jurisdictional problems encountered when individuals switch roles in 
the midst of the legal and ethical system and looks into the various ways courts 
can deal with disciplining those who have switched roles. Section A of Part IV 
examines disciplinary measures for judicial candidates. Section B examines 
jurisdictions that deny jurisdiction to attorney disciplinary bodies over prior acts 
of sitting judges. Section C examines arguments made for allowing attorney 
disciplinary bodies to oversee attorney-conduct, even if it means jurisdiction over 
a sitting judge for pre-bench behavior. Section D concludes Part IV by examining 
the disciplining of former judges that they might not escape scrutiny simply by 
announcing retirement. Part V lays out the disciplinary measures available to 
non-attorneys on the bench or those in judicial-like positions. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF ROLE-BASED ETHICS 
"To a significant degree, our concept of a code of judicial ethics is shaped by 
our notion of the role of those it regulates."3 Similarly, our expectation as to the 
behavior of lawyers is role-based.4 The Judicial Code espouses a standard of 
conduct in which each judge is charged with preserving the integrity and 
1. As suggested in the title, the ennine and woolsack represent this higher standard by identifying the 
required purity and the inherent importance of the judiciary. "When a lawyer dons the ennine and mounts the 
woolsack he assumes a very serious obligation to the people he serves. Nothing more seriously affects their 
lives, their property and their safety than his decisions, the weight of which is detet rnined by his wisdom and 
integrity. The ennine is the symbol of purity, honor and wisdom, that brand of wisdom which is the flower of 
years and experience. From the time he is clothed with judicial authority he is a marked man. His words and his 
conduct should inspire confidence; he might well strive to honor the bench instead of having it honor him. The 
judiciary is the capstone of our democracy but it will be S<:> no longer than its deportment warrants." Cone v. 
Cone, 68 So.2d 886, 887-88 (Fla. 1953). 
2. /d. at 888. 
3. Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW AND CONTEM. 
PRos. 3, 3 ( 1970). 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCf preamble (1983) (hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
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independence of the judiciary. 5 In regard to lawyers·' obligations, the Model Rules 
sets out its own role-based approach; "Law:yers play a vital role in the 
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by 
lawyers of their relationship to our legal .system."6 
The most pertinent difference between the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct is breadth. The role of the lawyer, and 
therefore the system of rules that applies, focuses on the lawyer·'s duty within the 
legal system.7 That is, a lawyer's conduct is generally regulated only in regard to 
that lawyer's specific contact with the legal system. In contrast, the judge~s role 
includes behavior both as a professional and as a human being.8 This divergence 
in the breadth of the perceived roles of judges and lawyers .has created differing 
codes of conduct for each group. The Model Rules emphasize the lawyer's 
differing roles within the system by addressing such issues as the funda1nental 
lawyer-client relationship,9 the lawyer as a counselor, 10 the lawyer as an 
advocate, 11 transactions with non-clients, 12 participation in law firms and 
associations, 13 public service, 14 allowable rendering of legal services, 15 and 
maintaining the integrity of the profession. 16 In .comparison, the Judicial Code 
emphasizes a judge's personal life (corrunonly called "off-the-·bench behavior"). 
Such concerns include maintaining the integrity of .the profession, 17 avoiding 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, 1 8 proper performance of judicial 
duties, 19 quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities,20 allowable compensation for 
quasi -judicial and extra-judicial activities, 21 and political activities .. 22 As other 
5. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCf Canon 1 (1973) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE]. The Reporter's Notes to the 
Code of Judicial Conduct explain that Canon 1 expresses the underlying philosophy of the Code. E.W. THoDE, 
REPORTER's NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCf 49 ( 1973). 
6. MODEL RULES OF PR.oF'L CONDUCT preamble, cmt. 12. 
7. As a representative of a client, a lawyer's role may be that of an .advisor, advocate and negotiator. MODEL 
RULES preamble, cmt 2. Lawyers also serve as intennediates and evaluators. ld. Finally, a lawyer must 
acknowledge his or her status as both a member of the public citizenry and as a member of a learned profession. 
/d. at cmt. 5. 
8. ''The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of ·disputes and a highly visible symbol of 
government under the rule of law." JUDICIAL CoDE preamble, cmt. 1 ( 1990). 
9. MODEL RuLES Rule 1. 
10. MODEL RULES Rule 2. 
11. MoDEL RULES Rule 3. 
12. MODEL RULES Rule 4. 
13. MODEL RULES Rule 5. 
14. MoDEL RuLES Rule 6. 
15. MODEL RULES Rule 7. 
16. MODEL RULES Rule 8. 
17. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1. 
18. JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2. 
19. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 3. 
20. JUDICIAL CODE Canon 4 . 
21. JUDICIAL ConE Canon 4. 
22. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 5. 
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observers of this dichotomy have noted, "[l]t is striking that only Chapter 8 of the 
Model Rules deals with the conduct of lawyers outside of their role as lawyers, 
while only Canon 3 of the Judicial Code deals solely with a judge's conduct as a 
judge."23 
This divergence between what is expected of judges and what is expected of 
lawyers attests to the different roles these professions play in our legal system.24 
"[T]he lawyer serves the justice system as a conduit between the laity and the 
institution."25 Lawyers operate as tools or parts of the entire self-governing legal 
machinery, and are therefore best regulated on this level. In contrast, judges serve 
both a functional purpose and an abstract purpose.26 "Judges are the embodiment 
of the judicial system and as such their conduct, even extra-judicial conduct, is 
much more likely to effect the public's perception of the judicial system."27 
Hence, a system for regulating the behavior of judges must be broader than the 
system for lawyers. Thus, while the reputation of lawyers may have some effect 
on the public perception of justice, the public's belief in ethical and impartial 
judges is much more fundamental to a public sense of fair justice and equity.28 
23. Brian Holland, The Code of Judicial Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A 
Comparison of Ethical Codes for Judges and Lawyers, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 725,733 (1989). See also MODEL 
RULES Rule 8.2(b ), which simply urges lawyers who are candidates for judicial office to comply with Canon 5 of 
the Judicial Code governing candidacies for judicial office. 
24. The Preamble to the Judicial Code states, "Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that 
judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to 
enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution 
of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law." JUDICIAL Coos preamble~ cmt. 1 .. 
Thus, a judge's charge to remain a highly visible symbol necessitates an emphasis by the Code on the off-bench 
life of such a person. In contrast, a lawyer's role is not that of a symbol~ but rather as protector of the 
self-governing aspects of the legal profession. 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted 
powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close 
relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This 
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely 
in the courts .... To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the 
occasion for government regulation is obviated .... (A]buse of legal authority is more readily 
challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. 
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-govern-
ment .... [A] lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers .... [N]eglect of 
these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it 
serves. 
MODEL RULES preamble, cmt. 9-11. 
25. Holland, supra n. 23, at 733. 
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
27. MODEL RULE Introduction to Article 10 (Discussion Draft 1980). 
28. "Many Americans perceive the courts not only as honorable and fair, but also as important guardians of 
property and person in an increasingly large, diverse, and often threatening society. When individual rights clash 
with majoritarian values or governmental power, many Americans automatically respond by seeking redress in 
the courts." John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts Democratic Values and Judicia/Integrity at 
Stake, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 193, 196-97 (1994). 
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This belief is evident in the respective codes of conduct currently used to regulate 
lawyers and judges. 
II. REGULATION OF LAWYERS: AN OVERVIEW 
The regulation of lawyers by the use of ethical standards, as well as other types 
of regulations, is state-based. 29 Since 1986 however, some uniformity has existed 
due to the promulgation of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
published by the ABA Joint Committee on Professional Sanctions.30 These 
Standards are a model for disciplinary bodies to look to in imposing sanctions for 
misconduct. 31 In 1993, the ABA issued the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, which provide an overview of the proper structure for a lawyer 
regulation system and the proper procedure for disciplinary proceedings. 32 In 
most states, the highest court has the responsibility for the discipline of lawyers 
licensed in those jurisdictions, and many have closely followed these guide-
lines. 33 The highest court generally delegates the authority to the state bar, a 
disciplinary board, or a board of professional responsibility retaining final review 
power. 34 Most states use a statewide disciplinary system, which provides 
consistency in the process and substance of sanctions.35 Most states also follow 
the ABA recommendations for judicially controlled attorney disciplinary systems 
with only minor variations. 36 
Systems for disciplining lawyers generally include an office of disciplinary 
counsel, a hearing panel, a statewide review board, and final review by the state's 
highest court. Initially, the office of disciplinary counsel evaluates the complaint 
to determine whether it is a matter within the jurisdiction of the lawyer discipline 
system.37 This office then investigates further if appropriate, and either dismisses 
the complaint or files fortnal charges against the lawyer in question. 38 If 
29. See DEBORAH L. RHoDE AND DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 129 (Foundation Press 1995). 
30. See generally ABA JOINT COMMI'ITEE ON PROFESSIONAL SANCI'IONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCI'IONS (1986). 
31. /d. 
32. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION : BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, MISCONDUCf AND DISCIPLINE, 
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf § 101:2003-2007 (Jan. 26, 1994) (recounting the most used 
lawyer discipline systems) [hereinafter MISCONDUCf AND DISCIPLINE]. 
33. /d. at § 101 :2004; see also ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, SURVEY OF LAWYER 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES IN TilE UNITED STATES (1984) (hereinafter 1984 ABA SURVEY]. 
34. MiscoNDucr AND DISCIPLINE at§ 101:2004. See also CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL Ennes 
§ 3.1, at 79 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS]; 1984 ABA SURVEY (indicating that 1984 
Statistics reveal that 36 states had such a structure). 
35. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 3.2, at 84.; see also 1984 ABA SURVEY at 1 (finding in 1984 that 
46 states had implemented statewide disciplinary agencies). 
36. See MISCONDUcr AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 33, at § 101:2004 (stating that in almost all states, the 
highest court has the responsibility for the lawyers licensed within that jurisdiction). 
37. /d. at§ 101:2004. 
38. /d. 
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necessary, the panel or committee hears the case and gives a report on the 
proceedings. Depending on the available resources, hearing panels perfor1n 
varying levels of hearings. 39 Then, a statewide disciplinary board reviews the 
report of the panel or committee and either recommends sanctions or dismisses 
the case. Finally, the case may go before the state's hlghest court, which wields 
ultimate decision-making power in lawyer discipline cases. The highest court 
may follow the board's disciplinary recommendations or may impose more 
severe sanctions such as a long-term suspension or disbarment.40 Although most 
disciplinary counsel offices do not issue advisory opinions on the ethics rules,41 
many states now have an ethics committee to assist and advise practitioners 
through non-binding reports.42 
III. JUDICIAL REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW 
The regulation of judges is similarly state-based. As the Code of Judicial 
Conduct states: 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our 
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing 
high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The 
provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that 
objective.43 
When this canon is violated, public confidence in the judiciary is diminished, 
doing injury to our system of government under law.44 Formerly, to restore 
confidence in the judiciary, public measures such as impeachment, recall, and 
address were used to censure judges.45 Impeachment occurs when a legislature 
removes a judge from public office.46 Recall is a method by which the electorate 
can vote to remove a judge.47 Address requires that the legislature ask the 
governor to remove a judge.48 These methods proved costly, cumbersome, and 
were so rarely used that when they were applied it was often viewed as a personal 
39. ld. at§ 101:2004-2005. 
40. /d. at§ 101:2004. 
41. /d. at§ 101:2005. 
42. ld. 
43. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1. 
44. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1, cmt. 
45. See WILLIAM T. BRAITIIWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JuDGES?: A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURES FoR REMovAL 
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attack on the judge.49 In response to the inefficiencies inherent in such political 
remedies, state governments have developed informal, self-regulating methods 
of supervising judges similar to the methods used for lawyers. 
To fill the need for judicial supervision, judicial discipline organizations were 
created in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal judicial 
system.50 Judicial conduct organizations serve a three-fold purpose. First, they 
enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct. Second, they attempt to maintain public 
confidence in the judiciary. Third, they work to protect judges from frivolous and 
unwarranted allegations.51 These organizations review and supervise judicial 
behavior and reprimand errant judges, not as punishment, but to protect the 
public from unfit judges.52 As the ABA has explained, ''[T]he major purpose of 
judicial discipline is not to punish judges, but to protect the public, preserve the 
integrity of the judicial process, maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and 
create a greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on the part of judges 
themselves."53 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has summed up the rationale of 
judicial discipline as follows: 
The single overriding rationale behind our system of judicial discipline is the 
preservation of public confidence in the integrity and the indep,endence of the 
judiciary .... This Court cannot allow the integrity of the judicial process to be 
compromised in any way by a member of either the Bench or the Bar. 
Accordingly, institutional concerns figure prominently in cases involving 
judicial discipline . . . . Consonant with those institutional concerns, the 
detertnination of sanctions in judicial-discipline cases is not so much to punish 
the offending judge as to restore and maintain the dignity and honor of the 
position and to protect the public from future excesses. 54 
Given this over-arching principle upon which the foundation of judicial 
discipline is laid, courts have developed a three-pronged attack launched through 
disciplinary measures: announce, deter, and discourage. The discipline imposed 
must be designed to announce publicly the system's recognition of misconduct, it 
must be sufficient to deter one who is lured toward misconduct from engaging in 
such conduct, and it must be an appropriate way to discourage others from 
49. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Rev. Bd., 784 F.2d 467,470 (3d Cir. 1986) (examining 
Pennsylvania's creation of an independent judicial review board due to the "dissatisfaction with the 
cumbersome method of impeachment as the sole procedure for grappling with the problems of the aged, in finn, 
irascible, or, in rare instances~ corrupt judges"). 
50. BRIAN R. PITNEY, Note, Unlocking the Chamber Doors: Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before 
the Virginia Judicia/Inquiry and Review Commission, 26 U. RicH. L. REV. 367, 368 (1992) (observing that all 
fifty states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia have judicial conduct commissions). 
51. /d. at 368. 
52. See In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1998); CAL. CONST. Art. 6, § 18(c)(2) (2000). 
53. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT, 2 (Tentative Draft, 
1977). 
54. In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 121 (N.J. 1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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engaging in similar conduct in the future. 55 To trus end, public announcement, 
deterrence, and discouragement in effect triangulate the position of disciplinary 
procedures and sanctions properly aimed at the unique role of a judge. 
The standard for judicial behavior is clearly and intentionally higher than the 
standard for attorney behavior. 56 "Judges should be held to even stricter ethical 
standards [than lawyers] because in the nature of things even more rectitude and 
uprightness is expected of them."57 The expectation is reflected in society's 
tendency to equate fair, impartial judges with justice. 58 Many state courts have 
stated clearly that they intend to hold judges to a high standard, on and off the 
bench. For example, Ohio courts explained, "[i]mproper conduct which may be 
overlooked when committed by the ordinary person, or even a lawyer, cannot be 
overlooked when committed by a judge."59 Many jurisdictions have scrutinized 
the imposition this heightened burden of ethical behavior places on judges, and 
have nevertheless held that any restriction on the judge is outweighed by the need 
for an ethical judiciary.60 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained 
its belief that although "a judge is entitled to lead his own private life free from 
unwarranted intrusion," because he is subject to constant public scrutiny, "he 
must adhere to standards of probity and propriety higher than those deemed 
acceptable for others."61 The court discounted any sense of unfairness regarding 
this high burden, stating, "More is expected of him and, since he is a judge, 
rightfully so. A judge should weigh this before he accepts his office."62 Some 
jurisdictions, even when strongly supporting the need for an ethical judiciary, 
have strongly cautioned that assuming the mantle of the judiciary subjects one to 
great scrutiny of both p~blic and private behavior.63 Thus, "[f]rom the time he is 
clothed with judicial authority he is a marked man .... The judiciary is the 
capstone of our democracy but it will be so no longer than its deportment 
55. State ex rei. Comm. on Judicial Qualifications v. Empson, 562 N. W.2d 817, 832 (Neb. 1997) (''Thus, we 
discipline a judge not for purposes of vengeance or retribution, but to instruct the public and all judges, 
ourselves included, of the importance of the function perfonned by judges in a free society.") (citations and 
internal quotations omitted); see also In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 532-33 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998) (stating "[T]he 
ultimate standard for judicial conduct ... must be conduct which constantly reaffinns one's fitness for the high 
responsibilities of judicial office and which continuously maintains, if not furthers, the belief that an 
independent judiciary exists to protect the citizen from both government overreaching and individual 
self-help."). 
56. "A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept 
restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so 
freely and willingly." JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2(A), cmt. 1. 
57. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 1977). 
58. See Sahl, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
59. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 291 N.E.2d 477,482 (Ohio 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 967 (1973). 
60. See In re Pagliughi, 189 A.2d 218, 221 (N.J. 1963) ("Once a lawyer becomes a judge, his activities are 
restricted in great part."). 
61. In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203, 235 (Mass. 1973). 
62. /d. 
63. See Cone v. Cone, 68 So.2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1953). 
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warrants ... ~ The judiciary is in fact no place for the exhibitionist, one who has 
not matured emotionally or one who cannot restrain his passions."64 This higher 
expectation of judges can be a source of concern when organizations created to 
discipline judges seek to investigate the conduct of law.yers seeking a judgeship, 
when as lawyers, they are used to a less invasive swath of regulations. 
IV. ROLE-BASED ETHICS WHEN SWITCHING ROLES 
When lawyers commit professional misconduct and then later are appointed or 
elected to the bench, an issue arises over who may discipline them. This simple 
question is a morass of legal and ethical dilemmas. On the one hand, the bad actor 
was a lawyer when the misconduct took place and should therefore be subject to 
censure by the lawyer discipline system. However, this gives a panel designed for 
dealing with lawyer misconduct jurisdiction over sitting judges. Alternatively, 
because the person is currently a sitting judge, he should be subject to the 
reprimand of the appropriate judicial commission. However, it is questionable 
whether a judicial commission should invade the province of the attorney in 
punishing the acts of lawyers. 
The key problems presented are two-fold. First, a jurisdictional dilemma 
occurs unless the state constitution or a state statute is written to clarify who may 
discipline whom.65 Most states provide that judges can only be censured by the 
proscribed judicial commission under the authority of the state's highest court or 
by one of the older methods of discipline (impeachment, recall, or address) if 
they are left in place.66 This would seem to place judges beyond the pale of 
lawyer discipline for their acts as lawyers.67 This basic issue is one that can lead 
to dismissal of otherwise genuine cases of misconduct.68 
A second problem presented when a disciplinary body reaches out to punish 
behavior not typically within its jurisdiction is a choice oflaw~type problem~ This 
occurs because the lawyer disciplinary system is not set up to punish violations of 
the Judicial Code,-and the judicial commission is not set up to punish violations 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.69 Many jurisdictions have not yet 
provided any means by which disciplinary bodies can resolve this conundrum. In 
64. Jd. 
65. See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Neb. 2000) (examining as a 
threshold matter what body has jurisdiction). 
66~ .Jd.; see also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
67. In re Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr., 6 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Mo. l999). 
68. See Blackwell v. Bayles; 366 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. App. 1984) (stating "(t]he coun rules indicate that the 
Supreme Court and the Judicial Tenure Commission have the exclusive jurisdiction to consider this type of 
case •... The preliminary injunctions· and temporary restraining order are, therefore, dissolved."). 
69. Courts are more than willing to note this distinction. See, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 596 P~2d 
864 (Okla. 1979) (approving of Trial .Authority's refusal to accept Bar Association's position that attorney 
misconduct of a then-seated judge was conclusively established by an earlier proceeding finding the judge 
guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct}. 
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some jurisdictions, however, the grant of authority to judicial disciplinary bodies 
includes an express grant to discipline judges for actions that occurred prior to 
taking the bench. 70 Generally, this extension of jurisdiction applies in one of two 
ways. First, the judicial colll111ission may be empowered to discipline judges for 
their actions in campaigning for the judicial position.71 Second, the judicial 
commission may be empowered to discipline for conduct that constitutes 
misconduct in office, conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of 
justice, or another ground of discipline listed in the state constitution. 72 
In the absence of an extension of jurisdiction and some direction as to the 
extension of the substantive aspects of the disciplinary system, states are left with 
a gap in their overall scheme of discipline within the legal system. This gap 
created by these dual disciplinary systems primarily occurs when lawyers 
commit so-me questionable act just prior to taking the judgeship. State courts 
asked to resolve this issue in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory rules 
have, in recent decisions, come out on both sides of this debate. 73 States like 
Nebraska have decided that sitting judges are beyond the reach of lawyer 
disciplinary proceedings.74 Other states, such as Missouri, have decided that 
conduct prior to a judge's taking the bench falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
judicial committee and that such misconduct should be punished by the lawyer 
disciplinary system.75 
A. THE JUDICIAL CANDIDATE 
A person becomes a candidate for judicial office the moment she makes a 
public announcement of the candidacy, files as a candidate with the election or 
appointment (luthority, authorizes others to gamer support, or accepts support or 
contributions.76 Methods of choosing judges vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
70. See infra notes 72-73. 
71. See In rc Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Jud. Disc. 2000) (stating that a judge who seeks re-election can 
be disciplined by the judicial discipline system regardless of his success in the election, but an attorney 
candidate would be disciplined in the attorney system if he lost and in the judicial system if he won the 
election.). 
72. See MICfflGAN COURT RULE 9.205. See also In te Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (upholding the 
removal of a judge for acts of professional misconduct that occurred while he was acting as an attorney); In re 
Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Mich. 1975) ("[m]isconduct~ although unrelated to the perfonnance of judicial 
duties, and even if occurring before the lawyer becomes a judge, may be 'conduct that is clearly prejudicial to 
the administration of justice' "); In re Greenberg, 280 A~2d 370 (Pa. 1971) (mail fraud was grounds for removal 
from the b~nch even though the fraudulent acts were committed before becoming a judge); In re Sarisohn, 233 
N.E.2d 276,281 (N.Y. 1967) (judicial discipline is warranted by misconduct occurring before becoming a judge 
that would justify debarment from future office or which relates to general character and fitness for office). 
73. Compare State ex rei. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1 (Neb., 2000) with In re 
Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr., 6 S. W.3d 869 (Mo. 1999). 
74. See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2000). 
75. See In re Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr, 6 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. 1999). 
76. See JUDICIAL CODE Terminology (defining '~candidate"). 
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tion, sometimes varying within one jurisdiction~ and can consist of appointment 
by executive or legislative branches, appointment based on merit selection, 
nonpartisan election, and partisan election.77 A public campaign for a judicial 
position impacts the light in which the public views judicial officers in three 
ways. First, after a candidate is elected based on promises to the electoral body, 
she may feel the obligation to make good on those promises once seated on the 
bench. 78 A mirror image of that concern is the potential for vindicating certain 
attacks on a judge's record or tendencies launched by an unsuccessful oppo· 
nent.79 Second, a judge who wishes to run for re-election at the end of her term 
may be driven to arrive at decisions that will look favorably in future campaign 
ads, or at the very least avoid decisions that would provide a prospective 
challenger with ammunition.8° Finally, and most importantly in light of the role 
of a judiciary, the public may come to perceive that the judges will act in 
furtherance of their campaigns, rather than in regard to proper legal processes 
that hold litigant's rights as paramount.81 In light of the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of the judiciary even as cut-throat competition ensues to 
obtain such a distinguished position, both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the 
Model Rules demand that a candidate conduct herself with the utmost respect for 
th·e office. 82 
A successful candidate who has been transfortned from a lawyer or even a 
layperson into a judicial officer is held responsible under Judicial Codes of 
Conduct for her successful campaign. 83 In In reJudge Roy Cascio, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, acting upon the reconunendation of the Judiciary Commission of 
Louisiana, censured a successful judicial candidate for falsely claiming in his 
77. See JUDICIAL CODE Canon 5, n.5. 
78. See In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (citing In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997)}. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. (citing Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
81. /d. (citing Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. ·Of the Supreme Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 147, 144 (3d Cir~ 1991)). 
82. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 5 outlines a series of complicated hurdles designed to ensure a candidacy that does 
not result in the appointment or election of a judicial officer with favors to return and does not impugn that 
officer's tenure. MODEL RULE 8.2(b) refers the attorney who is also a judicial candidate to the JUDICIAL CODE for 
guidance. 
83. In fact, some jurisdictions go so far as to require a judicial candidate to undergo mandatory training in 
proper judicial campaign conduct. Ohio State Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(5) states, "No earlier than 
one year prior to and no later than thirty days after certification of his or her candidacy by the election authority, 
a judicial candidate shall complete a two-hour course in campaign practices, finance, and ethics accredited by 
the Commission on Continuing Legal Education. Within five days of completing the course, the judicial 
candidate shall certify to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline his or her completion of the 
course and understanding of the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct and applicable provisions of the 
Revised Code." OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. Jud. Canon 7(B)(5) (Anderson 2000). The court in In re Judicial 
Complaint of Hein, 706 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio 1999), held a prosecuting attorney liable for his improper judicial 
campaign statements about his opponent despite his lack of knowledge defense based on the requirement of 
familiarity with campaign rules imposed by Canon 7(8)(5). 
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campaign literature that he was an incumbent. 84 Of course, a genuine incumbent 
candidate for judicial office:, by definition, would already be subject to the full 
force of codes of judicial conduct in which the candidacy rules lie~ However, as 
the court in In re Tennant points out, the rules regarding a judicial candidacy 
apply to all candidates, whether they are incumbent judges or lawyers seeking 
their first judicial office.85 Although the Judicial Investigation Commission's 
complaint erroneously asserted that Tennant was currently s_erving as a magistrate 
ju-dge durin_g his campaign, and therefore subject to the judicial codes, the court 
noted that Canon 5 86 Hgenerally applies to all incumbent judges and judicial 
candidates. A candidate, whether or not an incumbent, and whether or not 
successful, is subject to judicial discipline for his or her campaign conduct.''87 
Even a person not already subject to a judicial code whose candidacy fails to 
result in her election stands under that umbrella of the judicial code upon 
becoming a candidate.-88 Regardless of the roles of a lawyer or a judge, the nature 
of the judiciary is such that both must be controlled under a judicial code to 
maintain its proper functioning and all-important credibility in the public eye. 
Once the judge is seated, the dilemma focuses on which disciplinary body shall 
be responsible for examining_ grievances and recommending sanctions. 
B. PRIOR ACTS OF SITTING JUDGES PUNISHABLE 
ONLY BY JUDICIAL BODY 
The issue presented in these cases caught in the gap between judicial and 
lawyer disciplinary bodies is whether the ABA-created lawyer disciplinary body 
may institute or prosecute charges against a sitting member of the judiciary for 
poor conduct as a lawyer. Recently, the Supreme Court of Nebraska spoke on this 
very issue, holding that the lawyer disciplinary body could not initiate proceed-
84. In re Cascio, 683 So. 2d 1202 (La. 1996). Ironically, when previously serving as an ad hoc judge on a few 
occasions, Judge Cascio was required and did sign a statement that said, in part, ''I will not use the title of judge 
or use any photograph in a judicial robe in any campaig,n for elective office, or use any other advertising that 
may mislead the public_ into believing that I am or have been elected to a judicial office." ld. at 1202-03. 
85. In re Tennant, 516 S.E.2d 496 (W.Va. 1999) (holding that judicial candidate;s personal solicitation of 
campaign contributions warranted admonishment, even though candidate was not an incumbent judge). 
86. /d. Canon 5 of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct is analogous to Canon 5 of lhe ABA Code of 
Jtidicia/ Conduct controlling campaigns. 
87. /d. at 498 n.2 (emphasis added). 
88. Case after case holds unsuccessful candidates who have never been judges accountable undetjudicial 
codes for improper campaign tactics. See, e.g., In re Bybee, supra note 78. Eliciting the vote of the same-persons 
over which a potential judge would preside presents such a potential for mischief that it is fundamental to the 
interests of the judicial branch to guard against such conduct by all means necessary. See supra notes 84-89 and 
accompanying text. Even MODEL RULE 8.2(b) recognizes the importance of attorneys obeying the ethical 
guidelines of judicial campaigns despite the differing roles of the professions. In fact, the same concerns of 
potential future litigants under a presiding judge bear on the success or failure of individual attorneys who may 
either reap the benefits of political capital sown with successful candidates or face the wrath of the successful 
opponent not supported by an attorney appearing before him or her on behalf of a litigant. 
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ings against a sitting judge. 89 This denial of jurisdiction of the ABA over prior 
acts of a lawyer when investigated during that lawyer's tenure as a sitting judge 
rests on two arguments_: 1) structural and public policy reasons favor disallowing 
lawyers to have jurisdiction over those under whom they serve:; and 2) the 
judicial disciplinary committee is adequately equipped to deal properly with past 
acts of a lawyer if it is granted the right to examine pre-bench acts which might 
harm the judiciary. 
1. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODIES AND SilTING JUDGES 
Structural arguments as well as public policy militate against allowing lawyer 
disciplinary bodies to discipline judges. States like Nebraska reason that their 
state constitutions and statutes treat judges and lawyers differently.90 This 
opinion is supported by the very role-based nature of the two different 
disciplinary systems, as seen in the varied levels of attention in the two codes 
directed toward ethical behavior outside the official duties of the roles.91 
Oklahoma reached a similar result in principle in finding that the Oklahoma Bar 
Association could not discipline a - sitting judge.92 In Chambers, the bar 
association claimed that it had authority to proceed against any Oklahoma judge 
if it deemed that such judge was guilty of mis_conduct on the bench. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that a sitting judge is technically 
precluded from practicing law, and is therefore outside the bar association's 
purview for as long as she holds a judicial position.93 Because all rights and 
privileges to engage in the practice of law are suspended upon being seated at the 
bench, role-based lawyer disciplinary procedures, designed to ensure that such 
rights and privileges are not extended to those unfit to practice law, are not 
appropriate to discipline judges.94 Hearkening back to a more traditional 
approach to judicial discipline, Florida endorsed an argument that couples 
structural reasons with a_ constitutional basis to deny the ABA's claim of 
jurisdiction over pre-bench acts as a lawyer, finding that the ABA's assertion of 
jurisdiction had "no legitimate objective other than the ultimate removal of 
petitioner from office, a result intended under our Constitution to be accom-
plished only by impeachment."95 A clear concern created by the possibility of 
judges being disciplined by a lawyer disciplinary body is that lawyers might hold 
89. Krepela~ 610 N.W.2d 1. 
90. Id. 
91. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text. 
92. See Chambers v. Central Committee of Oklahoma Bar Ass,n, 224 P.2d 583 (1950)~ 
93. /d. 
94. See In reProposed Disciplinary Action, 103 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1958). 
95. ld. at 633. However, the addition of another method of discipJine, such as through a judicial disciplinary 
body, presumably would not alter the analysis because that too would provide for removal of a sitting judge by 
means other than specified in a state's constitution. 
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power over judges in a manner not intended by the superintending powers of 
states' legislatures and highest courts and result in the removal of judges in a 
manner not contemplated by the states' constitutions.96 In an Alabama case, the 
Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that the forum for actions against lawyers was 
completely separate from that provided by the state constitution for ousting 
judges, and therefore neither forum could invade the province of the other. 97 
In addition to the major structural reasons for denying the ABA jurisdiction 
over sitting judges, there exists a major public policy reason concerning the 
independence of our judicial system. If lawyer disciplinary bodies were permitted 
to discipline members of the judiciary, the independence of the judiciary would 
be abrogated, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained: 
The judges of all our courts must have independence . . . . While that 
independence does not give them the right to indulge in the [unfit] 
conduct ... it surely must give them freedom from supervision by the 
practicing attorneys in their courts and freedom from any requirement that they 
answer and stand trial before the attorneys, and before the Bar Association ,. ... 
The opposite rule and practice contend for, as we have heretofore pointed out, 
could not accomplish any good, but would result in nothing more than discord, 
and could result in confusion, pernicious partisan political activity concerning 
the judiciary, and other results not beneficial to the administration of justice, or 
desirable in connection with the service to be rendered by the bench and bar.98 
Alabama's highest court echoed this sentiment, concluding that allowing the bar 
to discipline judges would expose judges to an inappropriate review by attorneys 
because: 
[it] would be an act removing a constitutional armor, we think properly placed, 
around a judge so that he may remain free to function without fear or favor, and 
without subjecting his actions to discipline by lawyers who may be practicing 
before him, through the office of the State Bar Association, regardless of how 
honorable the motives of the would-be prosecutors may be.99 
In many jurisdictions, therefore, the lawyer disciplinary body may not 
discipline a sitting judge, even for acts of a non-judicial nature which took place 
prior to the individual's taking the bench. When a member of the judiciary 
assumes the bench, she is prohibited from practicing law, and this suspension of 
the practice also suspends the applications of the lawyer disciplinary system to 
96. See Krepela, 610 N.W.2d at 402. See also In re Jones, 12 So. 2d 795 (La. 1943) (stating that to allow 
disbarment of judg~ solely on the basis of loss of right to practice, would allow for the removal -of judges by the 
bar which could revoke a judge's license and thereby do indirectly that which cannot be done directly). 
97. See Alabama State Bar ex rei. Steiner v. Moore, 213 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1968). 
98. Chambers, 224 P.2d at 586. 
99. Moore, 213 So. 2d at408. 
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the judge . 100 Additionally, states, in creating these systems, sought to avoid 
subjecting judges to review by lawyers or otherwise breaching the independence 
of the judiciary. 
2. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY BODIES CAN PuNISH FOR ACTS COMMI'ri'EO 
PRioR TO TAKING THE BENCH 
Unless jurisdiction was vested in the judicial disciplinary body, denying 
. . 
lawyer disciplinary bodies jurisdiction over prior acts of a sitting judge would 
leave acts committed by lawyers prior to taking the bench essentially unregu-
lable. In order to provide the necessary mechanism by which to avoid the 
embarrassment of allowing unethical pre-bench behavior to go unscrutinized and 
therefore implicitly endorsed, states often rely on constitutional provisions and 
other language to support the jurisdictjon of judicial discipline committees. 10J 
Nebraska's constitution provides that a judge may be disciplined for any conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute, including actions of the judge that occurred prior to the time the judge 
took office. 102 The court in Krepela defended its finding of exclusive jurisdiction 
of the judicial disciplinary body as consistent with the overall system of 
discipline for judges and lawyers, explaining that the ABA had itself recom-
mended that a commission on judicial conduct be created with jurisdiction over 
allegations of misconduct that had occurred before service as a judge}03 The 
Supreme Court of Florida also has consistently ruled that pre-judicial conduct 
may be used as a basis for removal or reprimand of a judge by the judicial 
disciplinary body, because the state constitution includes a similar grant of 
authority to investigate pre-judicial acts_ and recommend to the state's high court 
. -
the removal (for unfitness) or reprimand (for misconduct) of a sitting judge: 
"[t]he language of section 12 [Fla. Const. Art. V, § 12(a)] is unambiguous on its 
. . 
face and we conclude that it means just what it says: The_ Connnission may 
investigate and recorrunend the removal or reprimand of any judge. whose 
·conduct in or outside of office warrants such action." 104 
Even absent explicit constitutional grants of jurisdiction as found in the 
I 00. See JUDICIAL CODE Canon 4(G). 
10 l. In Krepela, the ·Nebraska Supreme Court held that the judicial disciplinary body could properly punish a 
judge for thejudge's acts prior to taking the bench, finding support in the state constitution, which provides the 
judicial disciplinary body with the authority to consider the acts of ajudge that occurred prior to the judge's 
assuming the bench. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d at 5-6. 
102. /d. at 8. 
103. Krepela, ·610 N.W.2d at 5. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT§ I, Rule 2B(l) (1994). 
I 04. See In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 403 (Fla~ 1994) (The court cites a number of cases for this 
proposition.) See also In re Meyerson~ 581 So. 2d 581 {Fla. 1991); In reCapua, 561 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990); In re 
Camesoltas, 563 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1990); In re Berkowitz, 522 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1988); In re Sturgis, 529 So. 2d 
281 (Fla. 1988); In re Byrd; 511 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1987); In re Speiser, 445 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1984). 
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Nebraska and Florida constitutions, most states have at least some language 
which would allow the judicial commission broad discretion to examine past 
behavior that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or brings the judicial 
office into disrepute. For example, in a triad of cases decided throughout the 
1970s, Michigan found and affirmed the jurisdiction of judicial disciplinary 
bodies over ''conduct as a practicing lawyer unrelated to judicial duties, [because] 
such non-judicial conduct might be 'conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.' " 105 Those jurisdictions not granting authority over 
judges to lawyer disciplinary bodies are quick to find basis for authority of the 
judicial bodies to self-regulate. 
C. PRIOR ACTS OF SITriNG JUDGES PUNISHABLE 
ONLY BY LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODY 
Cases presenting this jurisdictional dilemma as to which disciplinary body has 
the authority to investigate judges for their conduct as lawyers have not 
uniformly been decided in favor of the judicial disciplinary body. On the issue of 
who has the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings against a judge, some 
states such as Missouri have decided that the lawyer disciplinary bodies are 
appropriate for punishing behavior committed as a lawyer regardless of that 
lawyer's present status as a judge. 106 The support for this choice rests on two 
arguments. First, the explicit jurisdictional grant of the judicial disciplinary body 
simply does not extend to acts committed by someone who is not a judge at the 
time he or she engages in the behavior. Second, any unethical acts by a lawyer are 
appropriately and adequately within the scope of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and punishable by the lawyer disciplinary system regardless of the 
perpetrator's occupational status when disciplinary actions are finally initiated. 
1. STRUCfURAL DENIAL OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY BODIES' JURISDICTION 
The primary argument for keeping the right to scrutinize and administer 
sanctions for a lawyer's actions with the lawyer disciplinary bodies, even if the 
forrner lawyer is a judge at the time discipline is contemplated, is structural. The 
very use of a dual system of discipline, geared towards different role-based goals, 
which subject individuals to different duties depending on their function within 
the entire judicial scheme, supports this narrow reading. It may be inappropriate 
for judicial 'bodies to discipline lawyers with their use of expansive inquiries and 
expectations of off-bench behavior because lawyers serve a much different role 
105. In re Kapcia, 205 N.W.2d 436,440 (Mich. 1973) (citing MICHIGAN COURT RULE 9.205(E)). See also In 
re Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1975); State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Moes, 205 N.W.2d 428 (Mich. 
1973). 
106. See In Re Burrell, 6 S.W.3d at 870 (holding that the judicial disciplinary body could not reach attorney 
misbehavior merely because the attorney had become a judge). 
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within the entire judicial system.107 
Many courts that deny judicial commissions any authority over previous acts 
of lawyers rely on strict readings of their state constitutions. For example, the 
Missouri constitution states in part that "[t]he Uudicial] commission shall receive 
and investigate all requests and suggestions for retirement for disability, and all 
complaints concernin-g misconduct of all judges, members of the judicial 
commissions, and of this commission."108 Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court 
read this subsection to grant the judicial commission authority over the 
misconduct of sitting judges only, therefore denying the Commission any 
authority over misconduct by lawyers before they become judges. 109 Moreover, 
the court viewed nothing in the constitution to give judicial disciplinary bodies 
any sort of pendent jurisdiction over the misconduct of lawyers merely because 
they become judges, but instead found that the judge's alleged misconduct was 
outside the reach of the judicial disciplinary body because it occurred while she 
still was a lawyer. Such fonnalistic analysis without regard to the previously 
enumerated countervailing concerns also results in finding lawyer disciplinary 
bodies adequate to discipline judges. 
2. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODIES CAN PuNISH FOR ACTS COMMI'I,'ED 
PRIOR TO TAKING THE BENCH 
Denying the judicial disciplinary bodies jurisdiction would leave acts commit-
ted by lawyers prior to taking the bench unregulated and essentially unregulable, 
unless jurisdiction was found for the lawyer disciplinary body. In In re Burrell, 
the Missouri Supreme Court found that while the judicial body could not take 
action, the lawyer disciplinary body could properly punish a judge for thejudge's 
acts prior to taking the bench. 110 The court believed that the lawyer disciplinary 
body could adequately deal with the concerns of the judicial disciplinary body 
about investigation of a judge for his acts in campaigning for the position of judge 
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(b) which states, "A lawyer who is 
a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct." 111 Of course, given the fact that the ABA itself has 
recommended the forrnation of a judicial committee to address pre-bench lawyer 
behavior, this rule does not necessarily indicate the intention that it be enforced 
by the lawyer disciplinary bodies. 112 
107. See supra notes 3-29 and accompanying text. 
108. Mo. CONST. ART V, § 24, §§ ]. 
109. See In re Burrell, 6 S.W.3d at 870. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. (quoting the MoDEL RULES Rule 4-8.2(b)). 
112. See supra note 101. 
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D. DISCIPLINING FORMER JUDGES 
A system that limits the authority of judicial commissions to addressing only 
those pre-bench acts carried out during a judicial campaign and those acts 
committed and prosecuted while the judge is sitting, but at the same time denying 
jurisdiction of a lawyer discipline mechanism because a sitting judge is 
technically no longer a lawyer, would leave a gaping hole of uncorrectable 
misconduct. A judge could simply retire, or, if the conduct was complained of too 
close to end of a term to allow a full disciplinary procedure, promise not to seek 
another ter1n to avoid sanctions. Under a regime such as this, a judge would have 
little incentive to watch her step because the threat of removal from the bench, or 
the stripping away of future livelihood in practicing law again after retiring 
would be empty. In this regard, courts have indicated that a judge may not retire 
and be absolved of his wrongdoings by virtue of her voluntary forfeiture of the 
position. 
In In re Thayer, a former judge sought to end proceedings against him for 
allegations of judicial misconduct while on the bench. 113 Thayer argued that upon 
his resignation, the conunittee lost jurisdiction over his conduct as a judge and 
any such case would pass to the Committee on Professional Conduct. 114 The 
court, however, analyzed the jurisdictional dilemma in tertns of the purpose of 
judicial discipline and the role of judges. Since the entire purpose of judicial 
discipline proceedings is to protect the public, preserve the integrity of the 
process, maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and create awareness of 
proper judicial behavior on the part of judges, that purpose is not only served by 
the removal or suspension of a sitting judge but also by the ability of the judicial 
commission to hold a public hearing and to levy sanctions other than removal, 
such as censure. 115 "Even after leaving office, an ex-judge retains the status of the 
judicial office on his resume. The public is entitled to know if the record is 
tamished."116 Further, applying for removal cannot replace judicial removal 
proceedings because there is a different concern that is implicated in judicial 
disciplinary actions that is not addressed by other proceedings arising from the 
judge's on-bench conduct. 117 Though there may be a split of authority on whether 
a judicial disciplinary body has jurisdiction over a judge who resigns, most hold 
that jurisdiction continues. 118 
113. In re Thayer, 761 A.2d 1052 (N.H. 2000). 
114. Jd. at 1058-59. 
115. ld. at 1055. 
116. /d. at 1060. 
117. /d. at 1059 (quoting Matter of Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 31 (N.J. 1985)). 
118. Jd. at 1059. Indeed, most jurisdictions which hold contrary rest on other principles outlined by their 
individual specific laws. See id. at 1060. See also In re Fuyat, 578 A.2d 1387 (R.I. 1990). "The principles 
recognized in these cases have rested upon absence of jurisdiction and the doctrine of mootness." /d. at 1388. 
The California courts have also recently addressed the issue. See Rosasco v. Comm. on Judicial Perfonnance, 98 
Cal. Rptr. 2d Ill (Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that an amendment specifically granting jurisdictional authority 
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The Florida courts have likened a claim by a retired judge that the bar has no 
jurisdiction to discipline her for misconduct while she was a judicial officer to a 
claim ''that a lawyer is immune from discipline for the most egregious ethical 
improprieties, so long as his misconduct disgraced not only the bar but the bench 
as well."1 19 The court reasoned that because actions as a judge bear on a lawyer's 
fitness to practice law at all, there can be a basis for discipline as a lawyer. 120 
However, an Oklahoma case raises an interesting concern: 
The public policy which renders a judge acting in a judicial capacity in a court 
proceeding immune from civil liability for damages must apply with equal 
force to a disciplinary proceeding [by a bar association] if the judiciary is to 
maintain its independence. In our opinion, an attorney may not be disciplined 
for acts committed by him in his official capacity as a judge unless such acts 
involve moral turpitude, of a fraudulent, criminal or dishonest character .... 
Lack of legal knowledge, unsound judgment, bias and prejudice, oppression or 
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion on the part of a judge in his official acts 
constitute no grounds for disciplinary action against him as an attomey. 121 
This "independence of the judiciary"' rationale, however, is easily rebutted. 
First, it does not address several primary concerns of judicial discipline: to 
protect the public; preserve the integrity of the process; maintain public 
confidence in the judiciary; and create awareness of proper judicial behavior on 
the part of judges. 122 Second, although it is important for a judicial officer to 
make decisions without worrying about liability: 
To hold judges exempt from professional misconduct proceedings would 
. . 
deprive members of the public of any remedy. Moreover, to hold that judges 
may not be sanctioned for actions which exceed their lawful authority would 
totally disregard the protection of the public, the administration of justice, the 
maintenance of professional standards, and the deterrence of similar conduct. 
We discipline a judge to reassure the citizens ... that the judiciary of their state 
over on-the-bench actions of judges after retirement passed in 1995, but was held to not act in retroactive 
fashion, and thus, a judge who retired in 1993 could not be investigated for his pre-judge conduct or his bench 
conduct)~ 
119. Florida Bar v. McCain, 330 So. 2d 712, 714 (1976). Acknowledging the distinction fomented by the 
role-based approach to discipline, the Florida Supreme Court relied on an early Wisconsin case, In re Stolen, 
214, N. W. 379 (1927). In In re Stolen, the attorney complained that misconduct in character as a judge had no 
bearing to the responsibilities and duties as a member of the bar; however, the court reasoned that one's lack of 
morality can be exhibited in many ways, so that if a judge shows the lack of moral qualifications required by all 
attorneys, it is the duty of the court to prune him out of the profession and not allow him to cloak himself in his 
office to avoid scrutiny by the bar. See 214 N.W. 379 (1927). 
120. McCain, 330 So.2d at 715. 
121 . State ex rei. Oklahoma B'ar Ass' n v. Sullivan, 596 P.,2d 864, 869 ( 1979). 
122. See Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929', 947 (Miss. 1997). 
1056 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 14:1037 
• 
is dedicated to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of 
men.t23 
In light of the ov,erwhelming public interest in holding judges accountable to 
every extent possible, it seems only reasonable that they should be subject to 
scrutiny both in the broader sens.e of that afforded by judicial commissions and in 
the narrower sense which focuses on their duties as lawyers. 
111. NON-LA WYERS AS JUDGES AND MISCELLANEOUS JUDICIAL POSITIONS 
It is no excuse that one acting as a judge is not or has never been a lawyer. The 
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides in its definition of "judge" 
that "[ a]nyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and 
who perfortns judicial functions ... is a judge within the meaning of this 
Code"" 124 In this regard, the Ohio State Code of Judicial Conduct requires that: 
No earlier than one year prior to and no later than thirty days after ·certification 
of his or her candidacy by the election authority, a judicial candidate shall 
complete a two-hour course in campaign practices, finance, and ethics 
accredited by the Commission on Continuing Legal Education. Within five 
days of completing the course·, the judicial candidate shall certify to the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline his or her completion of the 
course and understanding of the requirements of the Code of,Judicial Conduct 
and applicable provisions of the Revised Code. 125 
This requirement acknowledges that a person has a duty to familiarize herself 
with the appropriate rules of conduct befitting a judge, regardless of whether or 
not she is a lawyer. As Judge Jasen points out in his dissenting opinion in In re 
Dixon: 
[I]t would be most inappropriate to establish a two-tiered level of professional 
conduct for Judges: that of the lawyer and the non-lawyer. Upon taking the oath 
of office, a Judge, whatever his background, has an affirmative obligation to 
make himself aware of the bounds of proper judicial conduct. A judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself 
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary may be preserved. 126 
This two-tiered system could not be based on the public interests served by 
judicial discipline a litigant cares about integrity of the judicial process first 
123. /d. at 948 (equating judicial proceedings with bar proceedings in that they both aim to protect the 
public) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
124. JUDICIAL CoDE Application A (emphasis added). 
125. See OHIO STATE CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(b)(5), supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
126. In re Dixon 393 N.E.2d 523, 527 (N.Y. 1979) (Jasen, J. dissenting) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
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and foremost, not what profession the judge had before deciding the litigant's 
case. 
The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct contains specific provisions regarding 
those individuals not serving as full-time judges. 127 The definition of judge is 
tailored to encompass all roles in which an individual performs judicial 
functions. 128 The retired judge subject to recall, 129 continuing part-time judge, 130 
periodic part-time judge·, 131 and pro tempore part-time judge 132 all are subject to 
the Code. In Thomas the court held that a mayor who sometimes acted as a pro 
tempore judge fell under the definition of "judge" and subsequently held him 
accountable to the judicial commission. 133 The mayor contended that the 
commission had absolutely no authority against _persons outside the judiciary. 134 
However, applying the analogous state code of conduct, he was deemed a ''judge" 
because he had served as a judge, and the coutt agreed that the commission had 
jurisdiction. 135 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed interest in maintaining strict 
control over even the lowest of courts, stating: 
There are good reasons why our justice court judges must regard scrupulously 
the nature of their office. In the first place, most of our citizens have their 
primary, if not their only, direct contact with the law through the office of the 
justice court judge. The perception of justice of most of our citizens is forged 
out of their experiences with our justice court judges. If these judges do not 
behave with judicial temperament and perform their duties according to the law 
and by reference to the process of adjudication, there seems little hope that our 
citizenry at large may understand and respect the legal process. 136 
CONCLUSION 
A role-based view of judicial and lawyer discipline is the key to maintaining a 
healthy system, especially considering that "[m]any Americans perceive the 
courts not only as honorable and fair, but also as important guardians of property 
and person in an increasingly large, diverse, and often threatening society." 137 
127. JUDICIAL CODE Application C-E. 
128. Specifically the definition states: "Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial 
system and who performs judicial functions, including an officer such as a magistrate, court commissioner, 
special master or referee, is a judge within the meaning of this Code." /d. Application A. As the commentary 
notes, "The four categories of judicial service in other than full-time capacity are necessarily defined in general 
tenns because of the widely varying forrns of judicial service." /d. Application A, cmt. 
129. /d. Application B. 
130. /d. Application C. 
131. /d. Application D. 
• 
132. /d. Application E. 
133. Mississippi Judicial Perfonnance Commission v. Thomas, 549 So. 2d 962 (Miss. 1989). 
134. Id. at 964. 
135. /d. 
136. /d. at 965-6 (internal citations omitted). 
137. Sahl, supra note 28 at 196-97 and accompanying text. 
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Discipline must not be seen as a way of punishing those who have sullied their 
offices and the system, for that leads to tough jurisdictional questions and puts an 
accused's judicial peers in the untoward position of passing personal judgment. 
Rather, the better view looks at the roles of the persons, either as judges or as 
lawyers, and considers what is best to maintain the public's faith in the system 
that is oftentimes the dividing line between peace and widespread individual 
self~help. To this end, regardless of which disciplinary body acts, the trinity of 
public announcement of misconduct, measures to deter one from repeating an 
offense and punishment that discourages others from following suit, are 
all-important in effecting this role-based protection of all aspects of our American 
judicial system so erminesque in its fragility. 
. . 
